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Abstract—One of the central issues in the debate on network
neutrality has been whether one should allow or prevent prefer-
ential treatment by an internet service provider (ISP) of traffic
according to its origin. This raised the question of whether to
allow an ISP to have exclusive agreement with a content provider
(CP). In this paper we consider discrimination in the opposite
direction. We study the impact that a CP can have on the
benefits of several competing ISPs by sharing private information
concerning the demand for its content. More precisely, we
consider ISPs that compete over access to one common CP. Each
ISP selects the price that it charges its subscribers for accessing
the content. The CP is assumed to have private information
about demand for its content, and in particular, about the inverse
demand function corresponding to the content. The competing
ISPs are assumed to have knowledge on only the statistical
distribution of these functions. We derive in this paper models for
studying the impact that the CP can have on the utilities of the
ISPs by favoring one of them by exclusively revealing its private
information. We also consider the case where CP can charge
ISPs for providing such information. We propose two mechanisms
based on weighted proportional fairness for payment between ISPs
and CP. Finally, we compare the social utility resulting from
these mechanisms with the optimal social utility by introducing
a performance metric termed as price of partial bargaining.
Index Terms—Net neutrality, Game theory, Nonneutral net-
work, Pricing, Nash bargaining solution
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have seen much public debate and legis-
lation initiatives concerning access to the global Internet. Some
of the central issues concerned the possibility of discrimination
of packets by service providers according to their source or
destination, or the protocol used. A discrimination of a packet
can occur when preferential treatment is offered to it either in
terms of the quality of service it receives, or in terms of the
cost to transfer it. Much of this debate took part in anticipation
of the legislation over “Net Neutrality”, and several public
consultations were launched in 2010 (e.g. in the USA, in
France and in the E.U.). Network neutrality asserts that packets
should not be discriminated. Two of the important issues
concerning discrimination of traffic are whether (i) an internet
service provider (ISP) may or may not request payment from
a content provider (CP) in order to allow it reach its end users,
and (ii) whether or not an ISP can have an exclusive agreement
with a given CP resulting in a vertical monopoly. Indeed,
for Hahn and Wallsten [1], net neutrality “usually means that
broadband service providers charge consumers only once for
internet access, do not favor one content provider over another,
and do not charge content providers for sending information
over broadband lines to end users”.
The network neutrality legislation will determine much
of the socio-economic role of the Internet in the future.
The Internet has already had a huge impact not only on
economy, but also on the exercise of socio-cultural freedom.
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Union, as amended by
the Directive 2009/136/EC, established internet access as a
universal service1. However, internet is a conglomeration of
several profit making entities. Interaction among these entities
is largely governed by economic interests, and their decisions
can adversely impact the socio-economic role of the Internet.
Thus, it is necessary to understand the interplay between
various agents involved, and the knowledge gained can be
used in enabling laws that benefits society and its economic
development.
This paper pursues a line of research that we have been
carrying on for modeling exclusive agreements between ser-
vice and content providers and study their economic impact.
Such agreements are often called “vertical monopolies”. In
some branches of industry, steps have been taken against
vertical monopolies. As a result, several railway companies
in Europe had to split the railway infrastructure activity from
the transportation activity. However, in the telecommunication
industry impact of vertical monopolies is not yet clear. The
international community is still debating the laws to regulate,
or not to regulate, interaction between various agents in the
Internet.
In this paper we study another form of nonneutrality2
resulting from vertical monopolies that arises when a CP
provides private information to an ISP. The private information
could be popularity of its content, profiles of users interested
in different types of content, traffic characterization, usage
pattern, etc. We assume that the CP’s private information is
related to the demand generated through the ISPs. If CPs can
share this private information with an ISP, then that ISP can
adopt a more efficient pricing policy than its competitors. For
example, recent acquisition of Dailymotion by France Te´le´com
1A universal service has been defined by the EU, as a service guaranteed by
the government to all end users, regardless of their geographical location, at
reasonable quality and reliability, and at affordable prices that do not depend
on the location.
2The traditional net-neutrality discussion is about ISPs discriminating CPs
by giving them preferential treatment.
2(an ISP) enables it to have exclusive information about demand
for its video content. We derive game theoretic models that
enable to compute the impact of such discrimination on the
utility of the ISPs. We model the interaction between the ISPs
and a CP as a game, where the CP can share its private
information through signals. We also look at the possibility
of ISPs paying CP for access to its private information and
study mechanism to decide these payments.
Related Work: We have used in the past game theoretical
models to study two aspects of vertical monopolies. In [2] and
[3], we studied the impact of collusion between an ISP and
a CP by jointly determining the price each one charges. We
evaluated the impact of such collusion, both on the colliding
companies as well as on the benefits of other ISPs and CPs. In
[4] we studied the impact that an ISP can have by proposing
preferential quality of service or cheaper prices for accessing
a CP with which it has an exclusive agreement. We refer the
reader to [5] for a survey on net neutrality debate. In [6], the
authors study a signaling game between high quality and low
quality firms in a Bertrand oligopoly [7]. The quality of each
firm is a private information which is signaled to others by
the price set on their products. In [8], the authors propose a
metric called price of collusion to study impact of collusion. In
[9], similar definitions are proposed to consider several other
scenarios. The authors in [10] study cooperation in routing
games using Nash bargaining solution concept. They study
degradation in network performance by introducing a metric
called price of selfishness. Nash bargaining solution is also
used in [11] to study contracts in nonneutral networks.
Our contributions: In this paper, we propose a simple model
with one CP and several ISPs to analyze a network with
vertical monopolies.
• We first consider the neutral network where the CP shares
private information with all the ISPs or none of them. We
compare this case with a nonneutral network where the
CP colludes with one of the ISPs, say ISP1, and provides
signal only to ISP1. We show that an ISP receiving signal
improves its monetary gains, while CP may not.
• We then consider a case where the CP charges the
ISPs for sharing private information. We show that the
colluding pair, i.e., the CP and ISP1 that obtains signal
on payment, may not always gain. We characterize the
price, that colluding ISP pays to the CP, that results in
collusion beneficial to the colluding pair.
• We then propose mechanisms based on weighted pro-
portional fairness criteria for deciding payments that the
colluding ISP makes to the CP to obtain signal. We
compare the social utilities induced by these mechanisms
with the optimal social utility by introducing a metric
termed as price of partial bargaining.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we in-
troduce the model and set up the notations. In Section III,
we consider the neutral network in which the CP provides
signals either to all the ISPs or to none of them. In section
V, we study the competition assuming the demand generated
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Figure 1. Monetary flow in a nonneutral network.
through ISPs is linear in the user price. Section IV studies
a nonneutral behavior in which the CP colludes with one
of the ISPs. In Section VI, we allow the CP to charge the
colluding ISP for providing the signals. In Section VII, we
consider two mechanisms to determine the payment between
the colluding pair. In Section VIII, we propose a new metric to
compare social utilities induced by these mechanism. Finally,
we end with conclusions in Section IX. All the proofs appear
in appendix.
II. MODEL
Consider n competing internet service providers (ISPs),
namely ISPi, i = 1, 2 · · · , n, that provide access to a
common content provider (CP). Each ISP determines the price
(per unit of content) that it charges its subscribers. In our
model we consider single CP as few players, like YouTube,
Netflix, account for a significant amount of traffic generated in
the Internet. The demand generated by the subscribers of ISPi
depends on the price of all ISPs as well as on some parameter
θ reflecting private information of the CP. We assume that θ
takes values in some discrete space Θ. The model is show in
Figure 1. We summarize the parameters of the model in Table
II.
Parameter Description
θ indicator of private information of the CP
(signal).
pi(θ) Price per unit demand charged by ISPi to its
users; this can be a function of θ.
di(·) Demand generated by ISPi. It is a function of
the price set by all the ISPs and θ.
pa Advertising revenue per unit demand, earned
by the CP. This satisfies pa ≥ 0.
pd Price per unit demand paid by the ISPs to the
CP for providing signals.
UISPi The revenue or utility of the ISPi.
UCP The revenue or utility of the CP.
γ Bargaining power of the ISPs with respect to
the CP. This satisfies 0 < γ < 1.
n Number of ISPs.
3Let the vector p(θ) := (p1(θ), p2(θ), · · · , pn(θ)) denote the
price set by all the ISPs when the signal is θ. We write the
demand generated by the subscribers of ISPi as
di(θ,p(θ)) = di(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)) i = 1, 2 · · · , n where
p−i(θ) = (p1(θ), p2(θ), · · · , pi−1(θ), pi+1(θ), · · · , pn(θ)).
We shall assume that for each θ and i the demand functions
are twice differentiable and satisfy the following monotonicity
properties
∂di(θ,p(θ))
∂pi
< 0 and ∂di(θ,p(θ))
∂pj
> 0 for j 6= i. (1)
These conditions imply that if ISPi increases the access price
pi then subscribers of ISPi can shift to other ISPs, decreasing
the demand generated through ISPi while increasing that
generated from the other ISPs. Above conditions are common
in modeling demand functions in a price competition [12]. The
CP is assumed to have knowledge on the exact value of θ. The
probability P (θ) that the private information is of type θ is a
common knowledge to all ISPs.
The utility of ISPi is assumed to have the form
UISPi(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)) = pi(θ)di(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)).
The CP earns a fixed advertisement revenue of pa per unit
demand. The total revenue earned by the CP depends on the
effective demand generated by all the ISPs. Utility of the CP
is given by
UCP(θ,p(θ)) =
n∑
i=1
di(θ,p(θ))pa.
If ISPi does not know the actual signal θ then it can set the
price knowing only the distribution of θ. In this case we denote
the price by simply pi (doesn’t depend on particular realization
of Θ). With some abuse of notation, we denote the utilities of
ISPi as UISPi(·) in both the cases. It should be clear from
the context if an ISP obtains signals or not. In the current
setting CP acts as a passive player. It can only provide signals
to the ISPs, but does not control any prices. Its revenue is
influenced by the prices set by the ISPs. Again, with some
abuse of notation we denote the utility of CP as UCP in all the
cases.
The demand functions defined above are quiet general.
To study the price competition between the ISPs we further
assume that the demand function di(θ,p(θ)) is supermodular
for each i and θ, and satisfy ‘dominant diagonal’ property.
For a twice differentiable function supermodularity property
is equivalent to the condition
Assumption 1 (Supermodularity, [13]):
∂2di(θ,p)
∂pi∂pj
≥ 0 j 6= i.
The dominant diagonal property is defined for all γ, θ ∈ Θ as
Assumption 2 (dominant diagonal):
n∑
j=1
di(θ,p)
∂2di(γ,p)
∂pi∂pj
−
∂di(θ,p)
∂pi
∂di(γ,p)
∂pj
≤ 0.
For simplicity, we also assume that the price charged by ISPi
is bounded, say by pmaxi for all θ, such that demand from
for all the ISPs is positive. Also, the price sensitivity of the
subscribers is the same for all the ISPs. If ISPi increases access
charges while the others maintain their price, then a fraction
of the subscribers move from ISPi to other ISPs without
assigning preference to any particular ISP. Thus demand
function of all the ISPs is symmetric.
In the next two sections we study price competition in neu-
tral and nonneutral networks. We define utility and objectives
of all the players and compare their revenues in each cases.
III. NEUTRAL BEHAVIOR
In this section we study price competition in a neutral
network. In the neutral regime the CP does not discriminate
between the ISPs: It shares private information about its
content with all the ISPs or none of them. We study these
two cases separately, and analyze the impact of having the
information on the expected utility of each ISP and the CP at
equilibrium.
A. No information
We first consider the neutral behavior in which no informa-
tion is shared with the ISPs. The ISPs set their prices knowing
only distribution P (θ). Recall that in this case we denoted the
price charged by ISPi as pi. The objective of ISPi is to set pi
that maximizes its expected utility, i.e.,
E[UISPi ] := Eθ[UISPi(θ, pi,p−i)] =
∫
P (dθ)pidi(θ, pi,p−i).
where the operator Eθ[·] denotes expectation with respect to
the random signal θ.
B. Full information
Let us consider the case where the CP gives signals to all
the ISPs, i.e., all the ISPs are given θ. We also assume that
the signal is sent to all the ISPs simultaneously. Note that the
CP providing signals to all the ISPs is a non-discriminatory
act. Hence we consider this case under neutral regime.
ISPs can use knowledge of θ to set the price charged form
their users. The objective of ISPi is to maximize its expected
utility given by
E[UISPi ] = E[UISPi(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ))]
=
∫
P (dθ)Ui(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)).
Note that if any vector (pi(θ))θ∈Θ maximizes the expected
utility for a given {p−i(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}, then pi(θ) also maximizes
UISPi(θ,p(θ)) for each θ. Thus the objective of each player
is to maximize UISPi(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)) for each value of θ. In
this case strategy of each ISPi is to choose a pricing function
on Θ, i.e., pi : Θ→ [0 pmaxi ].
4Theorem 1: Assume that the demand function are super-
modular and satisfy the dominant diagonal property for all the
ISPs and θ. Then the price competition in the neutral regime
has the following properties:
• When all the ISPs obtain the signals, equilibrium exists
and unique.
• When none of the ISPs obtain the signals, equilibrium
exists and unique.
The proof follows by verifying that the expected utilities are
supermodular and satisfy dominant diagonal condition.
IV. NONNEUTRAL BEHAVIOR
In a nonneutral network the CP can discriminate between
the ISPs by giving preferential treatment to, or making an
exclusive agreement with, one of the ISPs. In this subsection
we assume that CP shares information with one of the ISPs.
Without loss of generality we assume that the CP shares
information with ISP1 through signals. Then ISP1 can set
access price knowing the signal, whereas the other ISPs does
so knowing only the distribution. In this case we say that CP
and ISP1 are in collusion, and refer to them as colluding pair.
The utilities of ISP1 and other ISPs are given, respectively, as
follows:
UISP1(θ, p1(θ), p−1) = di(θ, p1(θ), p−1)p1(θ)
UISPj (θ, pj , p−j) = dj(θ, pj , p−j)pj j = 2, · · · , n.
In the above utilities we write p1(·) as a function of the θ,
whereas pj, j = 2, 3, · · · , n are constants chosen knowing
only distribution of θ. The objective of ISP1 and ISPj , j =
2, 3, · · · , n is to maximize their expected utilities given, re-
spectively, as follow
E[UISP1 ] =
∫
P (dθ)U1(θ, p1(θ), p−1),
E[UISPj ] =
∫
P (dθ)Uj(θ, pj , p−j).
Theorem 2: Assume that the demand functions are super-
modular and satisfy diagonal dominance property for each ISP
and θ. Assume that the CP provides information only to ISP1.
Then equilibrium exists in the nonneutral regime and is unique.
After establishing existence of equilibrium prices in both
neutral and nonneutral regimes it is interesting to compare
the utilities in both the regimes to see the impact of sharing
private information on revenues of the ISPs. Though it appears
that an ISP receiving signal should obtain higher revenue
compared to an ISP without signal, this observation is not
true in general: One can construct simple examples where a
player with more information can gain or loose even when
equilibrium is unique. For example, see [14]. Also, the authors
in the same paper give conditions on the feasible payoff sets
that ensures higher utilities at equilibrium for a more informed
player. However, these conditions are not easy to verify in a
game with continuous strategy space.
There are several demand functions which are log-
supermodular and satisfy monotonicity and diagonal property.
For example, Linear, Logit, Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES), Cobb-Douglas, etc [12]. By appropriately choosing
the term that depends on the signal θ, we can use any
of them to model demand functions. In the following we
restrict our attention to linear demand function to study the
impact of signaling. Linear demand functions are often used
to model demand functions in economic literatures [12] due
to simplicity of analysis.
V. LINEAR DEMAND FUNCTION
For given price vector p(θ), assume that demand generated
through ISPi is given by
di(θ,p(θ)) = Di(θ)− αpi(θ) + β
∑
j 6=i
pj . (2)
where α > 0 and β > 0, and Di(θ) denotes the demand
generated through ISPi when private information of the CP
corresponds to θ and all the ISPs give free access to the
CP . For simplicity, we assume that all the ISPs are equally
competitive and set Di(θ) = D(θ), i.e., if all the ISPs offer
free subscription then the demand generated through each ISP
is the same. Also, the users are assumed to be equally sensitive
to the price set by each ISP, thus we take α and β to be the
same in the demand function of each ISP. Note that linear
demand function is supermodular and satisfies the dominant
diagonal property if α > (n − 1)β. We assume this relation
holds in the sequel.
Due to simple structure of linear demand function one can
compute the equilibrium prices and equilibrium utilities in
both the neutral regime and nonneutral regime explicitly and
compare.
Theorem 3: Assume that demand function is (2) for each
ISP and α > (n−1)β. Then, in the neutral regime, ISPs obtain
higher revenue when all of them receive signals, compared to
the case where none of them receive signals. In the nonneutral
regime,
1) the colluding ISP obtains higher revenue at equilibrium
than the noncolluding ISPs.
2) the revenue of the colluding ISP further improves if the
noncolluding ISPs also receive signals.
3) the revenue of the noncolluding ISPs remains the same
as in the neutral regime where none of the ISPs receive
signals (no information).
Finally, the revenue of the CP at equilibrium is the same in
all the cases.
As we note from the above theorem, if ISPs receive signal
they only earn higher revenues. However, this increase in ISPs
revenue is not because of increased demand, but due to the
optimal choice of subscription prices. In particular, as shown
in the proof, the demand generated through each ISP remains
the same at equilibrium, irrespective of whether it receives
signal or not. Thus, the CP does not gain anything by sharing
its private information as its revenue depends only on the total
5demand generated. Hence the CP has an incentive to charge
the ISPs for sharing its private information.
In the rest of the paper we restrict our attention to the case
with just two ISPs for ease of exposition. However, it is not
very restrictive as end users often face a duopoly ISP market.
VI. SIGNALING WITH SIDE PAYMENTS
In this section we assume that CP charges ISPs for providing
signaling information. We assume that if an ISP receives
signal from the CP it pays a fixed price of pd per unit
demand generated by its subscribers. We refer to pd as side
payment. We consider the nonneutral regime where ISP1 gets
preferential treatment from the CP. Our aim is to study the
impact of side payment on the equilibrium utilities of the
colluding pair (ISP1 and CP) and on the non-colluding ISP2. In
particular, we will be interested in characterizing the values of
side payment that makes the collusion with the CP beneficial
to ISP1 and vice versa.
A. Nonneutral network with pricing
We define the utility of the ISP1, ISP2 and CP respectively
as follows:
UISP1(θ, p1(θ), p2) = (D0(θ)− αp1(θ) + βp2)(p1(θ)− pd)
UISP2(θ, p1(θ), p2) = (D0(θ)− αp2 + βp1(θ))p2
UCP (θ, p1(θ), p2) = (D0(θ)− αp1(θ) + βp2)(pa + pd)
+ (D0(θ)− αp2 + βp1(θ))pa
The CP informs the value of pd to ISP1 while they enter in
to the agreement. Thus CP acts as a passive player, providing
signals, which in turn affects the demand generated by the
subscribers of the ISPs. We proceed to analyze the game
between ISP1 and ISP2. The objective of each ISP is to
maximize its expected utility.
Proposition 1: In the collusion assume that the CP imposes
price on ISP1 for sharing private information rather than
giving it for free. Then, equilibrium revenue of ISP1 decreases,
whereas that of the noncolluding ISP increases.
Thus pricing in the nonneutral network have a positive ex-
ternality on the non-colluding ISP. This behavior can be
explained as follows: When ISP1 is charged, it too charges
its subscribers higher to compensate for the extra payment it
makes to the CP (see proof of Prop. 1). Whereas ISP2 does not
need to increase its access fee, and also, some of the users of
ISP1 shift to ISP2. This increases demand generated through
ISP2, thus improving the revenue of the non-colluding ISP.
Unlike for the non-colluding ISP2, revenue of the colluding
pair may or may not improve. It depends on the value of pd.
The following theorem characterizes its range.
Theorem 4: Assume that in a collusion CP provides signal
to ISP1 by charging a price pd per unit demand. Also assume
that the distribution of θ is such that V ar(D(θ)) ≤ E[D(θ)].
Then,
1) ISP1 has an incentive to collude with the CP if and only if
pd ≤
(2α+ β)E[D(θ)]
2α2 − β2
{
1−
√
1−
(2α− β)2V ar(D(θ))
4α2E2[D(θ)]
}
.
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Figure 2. Utilities of colluding ISP and CP.
2) The CP has an incentive to collude if and only if
pd ≤
E[D(θ)](4α2 − β2)
(2α− β)(2α2 − β2)
−
(2α2 − β2 − αβ)
2α2 − β2
pa (3)
Further, the colluding ISP obtains higher revenue than the non-
colluding ISP if and only if
pd ≤
(2α+ β)E[D(θ)]
2α2 − β2 + αβ
×
{
1−
√
1−
(2α− β)2V ar(D(θ))(2α2 − β2 + αβ)
4α2E2[D(θ)](2α2 − β2 − αβ)
}
.
In Figure 2, we plot the utilities of colluding ISP and
CP as a function of pd. In generating the plot we used the
following parameters. The signal θ takes three values: high
(H), medium (M) and low (L), which corresponds to demands
D(H) = 200, D(M) = 50, D(L) = 20. The distribution of
Θ is taken as Pr(Θ = H) = 0.1,Pr(Θ = M) = 0.6,Pr(Θ =
L) = 0.3. The other parameters are α = 2, β = 1 and pa = 5.
As shown in the figure, if the side payment lies in the
region marked A, then the colluding ISP obtains higher
revenue at equilibrium. If it is charged a price outside the
region A, then collusion with the CP is not beneficial to any
ISP. For the CP, it appears that higher side payment will
increase its revenues. But this is not the case. If ISP has to
pay higher price to CP its demand goes down, which in turn
reduces the revenue of the CP. Thus it is not beneficial for
the CP to charge high prices from ISPs. Indeed, if CP charges
price beyond region B, governed by (3), it will not improve
its revenue. The collusion between CP and ISP is profitable
to both if and only if side payment lies in the region A.
Also, Note that in the region A, though both ISP and CP
benefit, CP can obtain higher revenues by increasing the side
payment but at the cost of reducing the revenue of ISP1.
Thus it becomes important to decide how the side payments
should be set so that all the players remain satisfied. In the
next section we look for mechanisms to address this issue.
6VII. MECHANISMS FOR SETTING SIDE PAYMENTS
In this section we look for mechanisms that take into
account the bargaining power (weight) of each player. As in
the previous section, ISP1 is in collusion with CP, in which CP
shares private information with ISP1 on payment. We assume
that both ISP1 and CP decide payment in presence of an
arbitrator, and refer to the process as bargaining. Arbitrator
can be a regulating authority, or a disinterested third party who
aims to set a side payment that maximizes, in a sense made
precise below, the revenues earned by the colluding pair. We
consider the following two game models.
The timing for the first game is as follows.
• ISP1 and the CP bargain over the payment pd.
• ISP1 and ISP2 set the access price. The prices are set
simultaneously .
• The subscribers react to the prices and set the demand
generated through each ISP.
In the second game, timing is as follows:
• ISP1 and ISP2 set their access price simultaneously.
• ISP1 and the CP then bargain over the payment pd.
• The subscribers react to the prices and set the demand
generated through each ISP.
The first game arises when the private information of the
CP changes over a slower time-scale making the agreement
between ISP1-CP last for longer duration, whereas the ISPs
vary access fee over a comparatively faster time-scale. The
second game arises in cases where private information of
the CP varies over a faster time-scale making the ISP1-CP
to renegotiate the side payments often, whereas the ISPs
price to its subscribers varies over a slower time-scale. We
analyze both models via backward induction and identify the
equilibria. In the sequel, we refer to the first game as pre
bargaining game, and the second one as post bargaining game.
In deciding side payment the arbitrator takes into account
only revenue of CP earned by traffic generated through ISP1.
For a given {p1(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and p2, the arbitrator decides
side payment pd from ISP1 to the CP based on weighted
proportionally fair allocation criteria given as follows:
p∗d ∈ argmax
pd
E[UISP1 ]
γE[UCP]
1−γ . (4)
The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] determines the bargaining power of
ISP1 with respect to the CP.
If we take γ = 1/2, then the above maximization is
equivalent to that of product of the utilities of ISP1 and the CP.
This is then the standard proportional fair allocation [15] and is
based on Nash bargaining solution which is known to satisfy
set of four axioms [16]. We note the method discussed in this
section is a modified version of the standard Nash bargaining
solution, abusing terminology we continue to refer to it as
bargaining. We may imagine that the bargaining is done by
another player, the regulator, whose (log) utility equals
U regulator := γU ISP1 + (1− γ)UCP, (5)
where U ISP1 = logE[UISP1 ] and UCP = logE[UCP].
Recall that the strategy of ISP1 is to choose price vector
{p1(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and that of ISP2 is to choose p2 knowing
only distribution of Θ, and utilities of ISP1, ISP2 and CP are
defined respectively as follows:
E[UISP1 ] = E[(D(θ)− αp1(θ) + βp2)(p1(θ)− pd)]
E[UISP2 ] = E[(D(θ)− αp2 + βp1(θ))]p2
E[UCP] = E[(D(θ)− αp1(θ) + βp2)](pa + pd)
+E[(D(θ)− αp2 + βp1(θ))]pa.
We now return to our game model where the colluding pair
decides side payment in presence of the arbitrator.. In both
games the CP is a passive player. In the first game, ISP1 and
the CP bargain over side payment and then the ISPs set their
price competitively. In the second, ISP1 choose price knowing
that he will bargain with the CP subsequently. Our aim is to
compare the expected utilities of each player as a function of
γ, and study how the bargaining power influences the players’
preference for the bargaining modes, i.e, pre bargaining or post
bargaining.
A. Pre bargaining
At the beginning, ISP1 bargain with the CP and decide side
payments. In this bargaining process we take into account the
bargaining power of each player. Once the side payment is set,
the game is between the two ISPs alone who set their prices
competitively to maximize their revenue.
We computed the equilibrium utilities of players in the proof
of Proposition 1 given as follows:
E[UISP1 ]=αE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
−
pd(2α
2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
)2]
(6)
E[UISP2 ]=α
(
E[D(θ)]
(2α− β)
+
αβ
4α2 − β2
pd
)2
(7)
E[UCP] =
2αE[D(θ)]pa
2α− β
− α
(2α2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
p2d
+
(
αE[D(θ)]
2α− β
−
α(2α2 − β2 − αβ)pa
4α2 − β2
)
pd. (8)
Utility of the CP given above consists of revenue generated
from traffic of both the ISPs. The portion that comes from
ISP1 is given by
αE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
−
pd(2α
2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
)]
Then the optimization problem of the arbitrator is given by
argmax
pd
αE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
−
pd(2α
2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
)2]γ
×
E
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
−
pd(2α
2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
)]1−γ
(pa + pd)
1−γ .
(9)
Taking logarithm of the objective function and differentiating
with respect to pd it is easy to verify that the above optimiza-
tion problem has unique solution.
7B. Post Bargaining
In the second game, ISPs set price competitively knowing
that the arbitrator will decide side payment between ISP1 and
CP according to (4).
As in the pre bargaining case, we analyze this game in the
reverse order, i.e., we first look at the side payment set by
the arbitrator as a function of ISP prices, and then study the
competition between the ISPs. Note that the demand function
d2(θ, p1(θ), p2) does not depend on pd. Then the side payment
set by the arbitrator for a given {p1(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and p2 is such
that
p∗d ∈ argmax
pd
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(p1(θ)− pd))]
γ ×
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(pa + pd))]
1−γ .
Lemma 1: For a given {p1(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and p2 the arbitrator
sets side payment as
p∗d =
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(p1(θ))]
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)]
−
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)pa]
E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)]
.
Substituting this expression of p∗d in the utility of ISP1 and
CP, the modified utilities are as follows:
U ISP1 = γE[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(p1(θ) + pa)]
UCP1 = (1 − γ)E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(p1(θ) + pa)]
Note that in the above expressions E[d1(θ, p1(θ), p2)(p1(θ)+
pa)] is total revenue earned by both ISP1 and CP from the
traffic generated through ISP1. In the post bargaining they
shares this total revenue in proportion to their bargaining
power. We proceed to analyze the game between ISPs with
the modified utility of ISP1.
Proposition 2: In the post bargaining game with the modi-
fied utilities, the equilibrium utilities are as follows:
E[UISP1 ]=γαE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
+
(2α2 − β2)pa
4α2 − β2
)2]
E[UISP2 ]=α
(
E[D(θ)]
2α− β
−
αβpa
4α2 − β2
)2
E[UCP] = α
(
E[D(θ)]
2α− β
−
αβpa
4α2 − β2
)
pa +
(1 − γ)αE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
+
(2α2 − β2)pa
4α2 − β2
)2]
.
We can now compare the expected utilities of the players in
the two games obtained in Proposition 2 and equations (6)-(8).
First note that the expression for the utility of ISP1 and the
CP in the pre bargaining game is similar to that in the post
bargaining game with pd replaced by −pa. Also, as seen from
(9) the side payment set in the pre bargaining game satisfies
pd > −pa. This gives the impression that ISP1 prefers the
post bargaining mechanism in setting side payment. However,
note the multiplicative factor γ in the utility of ISP1 in the
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Figure 3. ISP and CP utility in two game models α = 2, β = 1.5
post bargaining game. When the bargaining power of ISP1
is small, it gets only a small fraction of the joint revenue
it earns with the CP. Thus ISP1 prefers pre bargaining to
decide side payment, whereas CP1 prefers post bargaining.
As the bargaining power of the ISP1 increases, CP gets only a
smaller fraction of the total revenue earned, and it prefers post
bargaining. We plot the expected utility of ISP1 and CP in both
the game models as a function of γ in Figure 3. In generating
the plots we used the same parameters as in Figure 2 with
β = 1.5. As seen, there is a threshold on the bargaining power,
marked as point a in the figure, below which CP1 prefers pre
bargaining and above post bargaining.
VIII. PRICE OF PARTIAL BARGAINING
In the previous section we studied mechanisms to decide
the payment based on weighted proportionally fair criteria.
Another natural choice is to set a side payment such that
the sum of the utility of all the players is maximized at
equilibrium. Let p˜d denote this side payment, i.e.,
p˜d ∈ argmax
pd
E[UISP1 ] + E[UISP2 ] + E[UCP],
where the utilities are computed at the equilibrium prices of the
players. We denote the expected sum of equilibrium utilities
calculated at p˜d as U˜ . Recall that we denoted the side payment
obtained in weighted proportional fairness solution as p∗d in
(4). Let the expected sum of the equilibrium utilities calculated
at the weighted proportional fairness solution be denoted as
U . We will be interested in studying how good U is compared
to U˜ .
In this section we do not take into account the bargaining
power of each player. We shall be interested in simply the
product of utilities (i.e., without the exponents in (4)). A
more interesting analysis would be to compare optimal α-fair
social equilibrium utility, interpreting fairness factor as the
bargaining power. However, we will not pursue this thought
in this work.
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Figure 4. Price of partial Bargaining α = 2
In [10], the authors proposed a new measure called Price
of Selfishness (PoS) to compare the optimal social utility with
the social utility obtained at the Nash bargaining solution.
However, their definition of PoS is not suitable in our setting
to compare U˜ and U . This is because, in [10] the problem
is defined in a cooperative context in which the regulator
determines the actions taken by all the players, i.e, p1(θ) and
p2, and also the value of pd that maximizes the product of
the utilities of all the players. In our case the problem is not
fully cooperative. Bargaining is restricted to the parameter pd
alone. The other parameters are set through competition. Thus
in our model bargaining is over a subset of the parameters. We
therefore propose an alternative metric called Price of Partial
Bargaining (PoPB), which we define as
PoPB =
U˜
U
.
We will next compute the PoPB in the nonneutral regime
analyzed in the previous section where CP shares private
information with ISP1 on payment. In the pre bargaining
game, side payment p˜d is the maximizer of sum of utilities
given by (6)-(8) and p∗d is obtained from (9). The resulting
optimal values and the corresponding utilities are cubersome
to manupulate. We plot the PoPB in Figure 4 as a function of
τ = β/α fixing α = 2. From the figure we note that when τ is
close to 1, the PoPB is large. When τ is close to 1, the demand
generated from each ISP is equally sensitive to price set by the
competing ISPs, in this case pre bargaining leads to poor social
utility. However, when τ is close to 1/2, PoPB is close to one.
This implies that when demand generated from an ISP half as
much sensitive as to its own price then the resulting social
utility in pre bargaining is close to optimal.When τ is close
to zero, again the pre bargaining results in poor equilibrium
social utility.
We note that our definition of PoPB is not appropriate for
the post bargaining game. In this game, first optimal side
payment is evaluated for a given price of ISPs, and then the
equilibrium prices are computed. But the similar process of
evaluating social utility becomes independent of side payment.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we studied preferential treatment of ISPs by
CPs through collusions. We modeled a nonneutral behavior in
which a CP shares private about its content through signals.
We showed that the CP may not benefit sharing its private
information, whereas ISPs always benefit receiving signals. If
the CP charges the ISPs to share its private information, both
the CP and the ISP in collusion may lose, whereas the ISPs
which do not receive signals may gain.
We also studied two mechanisms based on weighted pro-
portional fairness criteria to set the price (side payments) that
ISP pays to the CP for providing signals. In deciding this
side payments we took into account the bargaining power of
the players. We noted that the bargaining power influences
players preference for the mechanisms. We also introduced
a new performance measure to compare the social utility
at equilibrium with the optimal social utility when some
parameters are agreed through bargaining and others are set
competitively.
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9APPENDICES
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We begin with the neutral regime with no infor-
mation. Taking the logarithm of the utility of ISPi we get
logE[UISPi ] = logE[di(θ, pi,p−i)] + log pi
Using Assumption 1 and monotonicity properties of di(θ,p)
given in (1), it is easy to verify that logE[di(θ, pi,p−i)]
satisfies supermodular property, i.e,
∂2 logE[di(θ, pi,p−i)]
∂pi∂pj
≥ 0 for j 6= i.
Then existence of equilibrium follows from Topkis’s theorem
[13].
Using the dominant diagonal property it is easy to verify
that for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n
n∑
j=1
∂2 logEdi(θ,p)
∂pi∂pj
≤ 0.
Then uniqueness of equilibria follows from [13].
Now consider the case with full information. We first
note that the demand function for each ISP is separable
in θ. Thus, given θ, ISPi sets a price that maximizes
UISP(θ, pi(θ),p−i(θ)) independent of what other ISPs set
when the signal is different from θ. Hence we can restrict
the study of price competition between the ISP for a given θ.
It can be easily verified that di(θ, p(θ)) is log-supermodular.
Also, by setting θ = γ in Assumption II the condition
n∑
j=1
∂2 log d(θ, p(θ))
∂pi∂pj
≤ 0
holds for all θ and i. Then existence and uniqueness follows
from Topkis’s theorem [13].
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: For a given θ the utility of each ISP is quadratic in
price. We compute the equilibrium prices by simply solving
the best response. A straight forward calculations results in
the following equilibrium utilities when the CP does not give
signal to any of the ISPs:
E[UISP1 ] = E[UISP2 ] =
α(E[D(θ)])2
(2α− β)2
, (10)
E[UCP(θ, p
∗
1, p
∗
2)] =
2αE[D(θ)]
2α− β
pa. (11)
Similar calculation results in the following utilities of when
the CP gives signal to both the ISPs.
E[UISP1 ] = E[UISP2 ] =
α
(2α− β)2
E[D2(θ)], (12)
E[UCP(θ, p
∗
1(θ), p
∗
2(θ))] =
2αE[D(θ)]
2α− β
pa. (13)
Subtracting the expected utility of the ISP1 in (10) from (12)
we have
α
(2α− β)2
(E[D2(θ)] − E2[(θ)])
=
α
(2α− β)2
V ar(D(θ)) ≥ 0.
Where V ar(D(θ)) denotes the variance of the random variable
D(θ). Now assume that CP colludes with ISP1 and shares
private information only it. Then, the expected utility of ISP2
and CP at equilibrium can be computed, respectively, as
follows:
E[UISP1 ] =
E[D2(θ)]
4α
+
βE2[D(θ)](4α− β)
4α(2α− β)2
. (14)
E[UISP2 ] =
αE2[D(θ)]
(2α− β)2
, (15)
E[UCP] = 2α
E[D(θ)]
(2α− β)
. (16)
We now compare the performance of ISP that receives the
signaling information with the ISP which do not have this
information. To prove the first claim in the nonneutral regime
we compare the expected utility in (14) with the expected
utility in (10) obtained when both the ISPs do not get signaling
information. A simple manipulations yields that (14) is larger
than (10) if and only if E[D2(θ)] ≥ E2[D(θ)], which always
holds.
To prove the second claim we compare the expected utility
in (14) with the expected utility in (12) obtained when both
the ISPs get signaling information. Again, a simple manip-
ulation shows that (12) is larger than (14) if and only if
E[D2(θ)] ≥ E2[D(θ)] which holds always.
The third claim holds by comparing utility of the non-
colluding ISP in (12) and (15).
Finally, the last claim follows by noting that expected utility
of the CP given by in the three cases reo(15) and (10) are the
same.
C. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Best response of ISP1 for a given value of θ and
p2 is
p1(θ) =
D(θ) + βp2 + αpd
2α
. (17)
Similarly, the best response of ISP2 for a given strategy profile
{p1(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}
p2 =
E[D(θ + βp(θ))]
2α
.
Solving the above best response equations simultaneously, the
equilibrium prices are given by
p∗1(θ) =
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
+
2α2pd
4α2 − β2
,
p2 =
E[D(θ)]
2α− β
+
αβ
4α2 − β2
.
10
Substituting these prices in the utility functions and taking
expectation we obtain the equilibrium utility for each player
as follows:
E[UISP1 ]=αE
[(
D(θ)
2α
+
βE[D(θ)]
2α(2α− β)
−
pd(2α
2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
)2]
E[UISP2 ]=α
(
E[D(θ)]
(2α− β)
+
αβ
4α2 − β2
pd
)2
E[UCP] =
2αE[D(θ)]
2α− β
− α
(2α2 − β2)
4α2 − β2
p2d
+
(
αE[D(θ)]
2α− β
−
α(2α2 − β2 − αβ)pa
4α2 − β2
)
pd.
The claim follows by comparing the above utilities of the ISPs
with the utilities given in (14)-(15) which corresponds to the
case when both the ISPs receive signals.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Collusion with the CP is beneficial to ISP1 if it can
get higher expected utility compared to the case when it does
not enter into any agreement. This happens if the expected
utility, given in (6), is larger than that given in (10). Subtracting
(10) from (6) and simplifying, we get the following quadratic
equation in pd.
f(pd) := p
2
d−
2E[D](2α+ β)pd
2α2 − β2
+
(4α2 − β2)2V ar(D(θ))
(2α2 − β2)4α2
.
The roots of this quadratic equation are
(2α+ β)E[D(θ)]
2α2 − β2
{
1±
√
1−
(2α− β)2V ar(D(θ))
4α2E2[D(θ)]
}
.
Let x1 and x2 denote the smaller and larger root respectively.
Note that f(pd) is a concave function in pd. It takes non
negative values outside the interval [x1, x2]. It is easy to
verify that for pd ≥ x2 revenue obtained by the colluding
ISP is negative. Thus the claim follows by noting that f(pd)
is nonnegative for pd ≤ x1.
Similarly, collusion with ISP1 is beneficial to CP if it can get
higher expected utility compared to the case when it does not
enter into any agreement. This happens if the expected utility
for CP in collusion, given in (8), is larger than that given in
(11). Subtracting (11) from (8) and simplifying, we get the
following quadratic equation in pd.
g(pd) := pd
(
E[D(θ)]
2α− β
−
(2α2 − β2 − αβ)pa
4α2 − β2
−
2α2 − β2
4α2 − β2
pd
)
.
Now the claim follows by noting that g(pd) is positive if and
only if pd satisfies the relation (3).
The last claim can be verified in a similar way by compar-
ing expected utility of ISP1 and ISP2 given in (6) and (7)
respectively.
